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No. 20061177-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LORIN BLAUER,

Petitioner,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES, an agency of the
and UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

State of Utah,

Respondents.

Brief of Department of Workforce Services

Statement of Jurisdiction
The Career Service Review Board's (CSRB's) Decision and Final Agency
Action was entered on December 6, 2006. R. 659-71. Lorin Blauer filed a
petition for judicial review on December 29, 2006. This Court has jurisdiction
over that petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004),
which confers jurisdiction on this Court over appeals from "the final orders
and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies."
See also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (West 2004).

Blauer filed a motion with this Court on April 9, 2007, seeking to have
this appeal transferred to the district court. Without reserving the issue for
plenary consideration, this Court denied that motion on May 7, 2007. See
Addendum B.

Issues Presented

1.

Formal CSRB adjudication
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from CSRB's

formal decisions. Pursuant to clear administrative rule, CSRB's decision here
was designated as a formal proceeding. This Court has already denied
Blauer's previous motion to transfer this appeal to the district court for a trial
de novo. Likewise, in a separate district court proceeding, to which Blauer
was a party and from which he did not appeal, the district court concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because CSRB's decision was a
formal adjudication. Given all this, and that no factual disputes need to be
resolved for this Court to review CSRB's jurisdictional decision, should this
Court deny Blauer's renewed request to transfer this case to the district court
for a trial de novo?

2

A. Standard of Review
"[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be to determine
whether the requested action is within its jurisdiction." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v.
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989). When a matter is outside
the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action."
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989).

B. Preservation of the Issue
This issue is unique to this appeal.

2. CSRB's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
The legislature granted CSRB limited authority to hear certain
employment grievances that have been raised before the employing agency
and then timely appealed to CSRB. After Blauer lost his demotion grievance
before CSRB, he filed a request for reconsideration, raising six new issues
that had not been timely appealed through the statutory grievance process.
Did CSRB correctly determine that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the merits of
those new issues?

3

A. Standard of Review
Since this issue raises a question of general law, this Court reviews the
"CSRB's conclusion for correctness, granting no deference to that agency's
decision." Holland v. CSRB, 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993).

B. Preservation of the Issue
This issue was raised by the Department in its motion to dismiss.
R. 465-632. The issue was considered by CSRB in its December 6, 2006
Decision and Final Agency Action. R. 659-71.

Determinative Constitutional
Provisions, Statutes and Rules
The following provisions are attached in the Addendum:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(l) (West 2004)
Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(2) (West 2004)
Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) (West 2004)
Code Ann. § 67-19a-202 (West 2004)
Code Ann. § 67-19a-401 (West 2004)
Code Ann. § 67-19a-402 (West 2004)
Admin. Code R. 137-1-17

4

Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case
This is a petition for judicial review of final agency action of the CSRB.

CSRB concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over new issues in Blauer's
employment grievance that were raised for the first time in a request for
reconsideration.

2.

Course of the Proceedings Below
Blauer, an attorney for the Department of Workforce Services

(Department), filed a grievance in July 2003 over an unsuccessful
performance evaluation. R. 528-33. He also complained of the Department's
failure to define job performance standards and that he did not have a
current performance plan in place. R. 532; 642-43. That grievance was
appealed to the Department's director, who ruled in Blauer's favor and
changed the performance evaluation to "successful." R. 548-49. Blauer did not
appeal that grievance to the CSRB. R. 636.
In September 2003, the Department of Workforce Services
reapportioned Blauer's job duties and assigned him to conduct administrative
hearings full time. R. 551-53. Blauer grieved his new assignment to the
Career Service Review Board (CSRB), claiming the assignment was a
5

demotion. R. 554-55, The Department denied his grievance, concluding that
no demotion had occurred. R. 559-61. After conducting an administrative
review of the file, CSRB concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the
grievance because no demotion had occurred. R. 20-26.
Blauer then filed a request for reconsideration, asking CSRB to review
six new issues not previously raised in the CSRB proceeding. R. 27-149. Five
of those claims alleged that the Department violated personnel rules. 1
R. 57-62. The other claim requested that CSRB review some purported
written reprimands in Blauer's file. R. 62. Specifically, Blauer alleged that:
a. the Department failed to define Blauer's job performance parameters
(R. 57-58);
b. the Department assigned job tasks to Blauer outside his job
description (R. 29-30);
c. Department representatives harassed and retaliated against Blauer
for his request for accommodation for disabilities (R. 59-60);

blauer's request for reconsideration also included claims of
constructive suspension and constructive termination, R. 61-62, but Blauer
makes no mention of those claims in his opening brief and has therefore
waived appellate review of that issue. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 23,
16 P. 3d 540 (stating that failure to raise issue in opening brief generally
constitutes waiver). Moreover, the district court did not list those claims in its
order of remand, R. 583, and Blauer did not discuss the claims in his response
to the Department's motion to dismiss. R. 633-46.
6

d. the Department failed to properly maintain Blauer's personnel
records and refused him access to documentation in his personnel file
(R. 60-61);
e. the Department improperly denied Blauer administrative leave
(R. 61); and
f. the Department placed negative letters in Blauer's personnel file,
thereby effectively issuing written reprimands against him. R. 62.
CSRB denied the motion for reconsideration, declining to consider the
new claims because it deemed those claims to be ancillary to the demotion
grievance. R. 276-82.
Blauer filed a petition for review in the district court, and the district
court ultimately agreed with CSRB that no demotion occurred.2 R. 582-83.
The court, however, remanded the new claims of alleged violations of
personnel rules to CSRB for consideration. R. 583. The remand order did not

2

And this Court, in turn, agreed with the district court, holding that,
because Blauer's assignment to conduct hearings full time was not a
demotion, "CSRB did not err in declining jurisdiction over Blauer's
grievance." Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2005 UT App 488, f 36, 128
P.3d 1204. While that appeal was pending, Blauer's employment was
terminated On November 3, 2004, based on his inability to return to work
after taking one year of medical leave. That termination is the subject
another appeal pending before this Court, Blauer v. Department of Workforce
Services, Utah Court of Appeals, No. 20060702. That appeal has been briefed
and submitted for decision.
7

specify whether a formal or informal adjudication was required and did not
direct CSRB to determine that it had jurisdiction:
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief is dismissed
with prejudice, with the exception that the allegations in
Paragraph 34 subsections (c) through (j) of the complaint which
. . . are not based upon unlawful demotion, and which were also
set forth by the Plaintiff in his Motion for Reconsideration
(previously filed with the CSRB), are remanded to the CSRB for
consideration.
R. 583 (emphasis added).
On remand to CSRB, the Department moved to dismiss the remanded
issues for lack of jurisdiction. R. 465-632. CSRB conducted a jurisdictional
hearing, where the parties presented memoranda and oral argument to a
hearing officer. R. 652-58; 659. The Department attached documentary
evidence to its memorandum. R. 483-632. Blauer referred to that evidence in
his response but did not submit documentary evidence of his own, although
nothing in the record indicates he was precluded from doing so. R. 645. CSRB
concluded, in a decision issued December 6, 2006, that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear the six remanded issues. R. 659-71.
To overturn CSRB's December 6, 2006 decision, Blauer then
commenced two separate legal actions. First, on December 29, 2006, Blauer
filed a petition for review with this Court, initiating the present action. Then,
on January 3, 2007, Blauer filed a new district court action seeking judicial
8

review, in the form of a trial de novo, of the CSRB's decision. The complaint
also contained a second claim for a declaratory judgment against CSRB and
the Department. See Docket, Blauer v. Utah Dep't of Workforce Servs., Third
Judicial District Court, Case No. 070900108.3
On April 9, 2007, the district court dismissed the new district court
action in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction. The district court's order stated
that: a "CSRB jurisdictional hearing is a formal adjudication"; "Utah district
courts are not granted jurisdiction over such appeals"; and the district court
did "not have jurisdiction to review the CSRB decision [of December 6, 2006]."
See Addendum A (Order of April 9, 2007, Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs.,
Third Judicial District Court, No. 070900108).
Blauer then filed a motion with this Court, seeking to have this appeal
transferred to the district court for a trial de novo, arguing that the CSRB
decision was an informal adjudication. This Court denied the motion outright
on May 7, 2007. See Addendum B.

3

This new 2007 action should not be confused with another district
court action Blauer brought against the Department, Blauer v. Department of
Workforce Services, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 040927275, that
was consolidated with the first district court petition for judicial review,
Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, Third Judicial District Court,
Case No. 040900221.
9

3.

Disposition Below
By its decision dated December 6, 2006, CSRB concluded that it lacked

jurisdiction to hear the remanded claims. R. 659-71.

Statement of Facts
In his opening brief, Blauer includes a lengthy statement of facts
relating the underlying allegations supporting the six new claims he raised in
his request for CSRB reconsideration. But those facts are unnecessary to this
Court's resolution of this appeal. CSRB did not address the merits of the new
claims because it concluded that the undisputed procedural history of the
case showed that Blauer had not properly preserved the claims for CSRB
review. Accordingly, this brief does not include a counter-recitation of the
underlying facts.

Summary of the Argument
Because CSRB's decision was designated by clear administrative rule
as a formal adjudication, jurisdiction over this appeal is properly before this
Court. Further, Blauer should be estopped from arguing that the CSRB
decision was an informal adjudication because the third district court ruled

10

against Blauer on this identical argument, and Blauer has acquiesced in the
ruling by not appealing it. In any event, transfer of this case to the district
court for a trial de novo is manifestly inappropriate because CSRB's
jurisdictional conclusion was based on undisputed procedural facts.
CSRB correctly dismissed the six remanded claims because Blauer had
not timely appealed those claims through the statutory grievance process.
One claim had been grieved to the Department director, but was not timely
appealed to CSRB. Another claim was subsumed by Blauer's demotion
grievance and had never been pursued as a grievance in its own right. The
remaining claims were never grieved within the Department but were raised
for the first time in a request for CSRB reconsideration. Because Blauer did
not preserve his claims as required by statute, CSRB correctly determined
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims.
Accordingly, the Department asks this Court to affirm CSRB's decision.

Argument
1.

CSRB's decision was a formal adjudicative proceeding and
jurisdiction is properly here.

In its May 7, 2007 order this Court declined to transfer this case to the
district court for a trial de novo. See Order of May 7, 2007, included as
11

Addendum B. In that order, this Court rejected Blauer's argument that this
Court lacks jurisdiction over CSRB's adjudication. Further, this Court denied
the motion outright, without reserving the issue for plenary consideration.
Yet Blauer repeats arguments now in his opening brief, again asking this
Court to transfer this case to the district court. To the extent that Blauer's
argument is a repeat motion for transfer, it should be rejected again.
Moreover, under principles of issue preclusion, Blauer should be
estopped from continuing to argue that he is entitled to a trial de novo in
district court. In a separate proceeding — commenced by Blauer for judicial
review of the same CSRB decision Blauer seeks to have reviewed here - the
third district court conclusively decided that it lacked jurisdiction to review
CSRB's decision. See Addendum A (Order of April 9, 2007, Blauer v. Utah
Dep't of Workforce Servs., Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 070900108).
The district court concluded that: (1) a "CSRB jurisdictional hearing is a
formal adjudication"; (2) "Utah district courts are not granted jurisdiction
over such appeals"; and (3) the district court did "not have jurisdiction to
review the CSRB decision [of December 6, 2006]." Id. Blauer has acquiesced
to this final determination by not appealing it. See Docket, Blauer v. Utah
Dep't of Workforce Servs., Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 070900108
(showing that no notice of appeal was filed from the order of dismissal).
12

Issue preclusion4 prevents parties "from relitigating issues which were
once adjudicated on the merits and have resulted in a final judgment."
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, f 27,110 R3d
678. Issue preclusion has four elements:
[1] [t]he party against whom claim preclusion is asserted
must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the prior adjudication must
be identical to the one presented in the instant action; [3] the
issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and
fairly litigated; and [4] the first suit must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits.
Id. (quotingMurdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, f 15, 982 P.2d
65 (bracketed material in original)).
Although the district court's April 6th decision was a dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds, and therefore cannot be used as a dismissal on the
merits of the underlying dispute, it nevertheless addressed the identical
jurisdictional argument made by Blauer here, and should therefore have
preclusive effect, at least over that jurisdictional issue. Although the
Department could not find Utah authority on this point, other jurisdictions
have concluded that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does preclude

4

The Department did not make this claim preclusion argument in its
April 26, 2007 response to Blauer's motion to transfer appeal because that
response was filed before Blauer's time to appeal the April 9, 2007 decision
expired.
13

relitigation "of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdictional question."
Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee's Int'l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1211
(10th Cir. 2001) (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4436 (1981)). See also Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059,1063 (7th
Cir. 1999) ("[A] jurisdictional dismissal precludes only the relitigation of the
ground of that dismissal, and thus has collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)
effect rather than the broader res judicata effect/') (citations omitted); GAF
Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that
judgment dismissing action for lack of jurisdiction will "have preclusive effect
as to matters actually adjudicated" and will "preclude relitigation of the
precise issue of jurisdiction that led to the initial dismissal"). Because this
Court and the district court have already decided the very issue Blauer now
renews, the Department respectfully asks this Court to reject the argument
again.
In any event, because CSRB's December 6, 2006 decision was
designated by clear administrative rule as a formal adjudication, jurisdiction
exclusively lies with this Court. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over
"the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
of state agencies." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004) (emphasis
added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (West 2004). Cf. Utah Code
14

Ann. § 63-46b-15(l)(a) (West 2004) (stating that the district court has
"jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from
informal adjudicative proceedings").
Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA),5 CSRB
has designated by administrative rule 6 that a "jurisdictional hearing is a
formal adjudication" and an "administrative review of the file is an informal
adjudication." Utah Admin. Code R. 137-1-17. To determine whether CSRB
has jurisdiction over an employment grievance, its administrator has
discretion to either "hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may
present oral arguments, written arguments, or both" or "conduct an
administrative review of the file." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-403(2)(b) (stating
that the administrator "may" hold one or the other).7 Because CSRB can
5

UAPA consists of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 through -23 (West
2004), inclusive.
6

CSRB "may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings
to be conducted informally," providing certain conditions are met. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-4(l) (West 2004). But "all agency adjudicative proceedings not
specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules shall be
conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this chapter."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(2) (West 2004). Further, CSRB may only convert a
formal proceeding into an informal one, or vice versa, provided the conversion
is "in the public interest" and "does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any
party." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) (West 2004).
7

A grievant is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim only if he
demonstrates CSRB has jurisdiction over his grievance. See Lopez v. CSRB,
15

choose between a jurisdictional hearing - a formal proceeding - and an
administrative review of the file - an informal proceeding - it can, with that
decision, also choose whether judicial review lies with this Court or the
district court. And because CSRB chose to conduct a jurisdictional hearing,
that decision necessarily dictated that any appeal would be before this Court.
The remand order did not limit CSRB's statutory discretion to select a
formal or informal proceeding to assess its jurisdiction. That order simply
"remanded to the CSRB for consideration? without specifying the type of
proceeding required. R. 583 (emphasis added). Only if CSRB had considered
the remanded issues in another informal proceeding - another administrative
review of the file - would the district court have had jurisdiction to review the
decision in a subsequent petition for judicial review. But since CSRB opted to
hold a formal proceeding, jurisdiction over Blauer's petition for review falls
squarely with this Court.
Furthermore, Blauer grossly misrepresents the recent CSRB
proceedings when he asserts that he received no more of a formal
adjudication on remand than he did initially when he raised the new issues in

834 P.2d 568, 573 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "[i]f an employee's
grievance meets the statutory requirements in subsection 403(2)(a), the*
employee is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim").
16

his request for reconsideration. The most significant difference is that CSRB
actually considered the new claims on remand, but did not even consider
them in 2003 because it deemed the claims as ancillary to the demotion
grievance. CSRB stated in its December 22, 2003 decision denying Blauer's
request for reconsideration: "I recognize that Grievant's Request for
Reconsideration addressed other issues primarily, but not entirely, stemming
from the argument that a demotion occurred. Based upon my decision herein,
however, it is unnecessary to address these arguments as I view them as
essentially ancillary to the issue demotion." R. 278. On remand, however,
CSRB analyzed each of the new issues individually. R. 666-71. CSRB's
decision was based on a review of its own record, as well as the briefs and
documentary evidence submitted to it, and made after both parties presented
oral argument. R. 659. Accordingly, this Court should disregard Blauer's
misrepresentations that the jurisdictional hearing on remand was no
different than the previous administrative review of the file.
Section 8 of UAPA provides that, in a formal proceeding, CSRB "shall
afford all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct
cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8
(West 2004). Despite this language, it does not follow that a full-blown
evidentiary hearing is a necessary component of every formal proceeding,
17

especially when CSRB resolves a case based on legal conclusions drawn
entirely from the pleadings, procedural history of the case, and documentary
evidence submitted to it. CSRB did not need to resolve any factual disputes to
assess jurisdiction and none need to be resolved before this Court can review
CSRB's legal conclusions. Blauer did not submit, nor was he precluded from
submitting, any documentary evidence that conflicted with the
documentation CSRB relied on to assess its jurisdiction.
As set forth in CSRB's detailed December 6 decision, the jurisdictional
inquiry did not require the resolution of any factual disputes. The
Department's jurisdictional motion to dismiss raised no factual issues
requiring an evidentiary hearing. Based on the pleadings in the record and
the documentary evidence submitted to it, CSRB analyzed each of the
arguments Blauer made in his 2003 request for reconsideration. As set forth
below, CSRB correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear those
arguments. CSRB made legal conclusions, not findings of fact based on
conflicting evidence. This Court does not need a trial de novo to examine the
same record and documentary evidence CSRB reviewed to decide whether the
lack of an evidentiary hearing warrants a remand to CSRB.
As this Court has previously stated, "[n]o purpose would be served by a
trial de novo in the district court where the relevant facts are not in dispute
18

and the issue is solely one of law." Hales v. Indus. Comm'n, 854 P.2d 537, 539
n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Blauer fails to identify what evidence he could have
presented that would have had any bearing on CSRB's review of the
procedural history of the case. He fails to show that he was precluded from
submitting documentary evidence to rebut the Department's evidence or to
rebut anything already in the CSRB record. He does not explain why his
failure to submit any conflicting documentary evidence to CSRB is not a
waiver of his right to do so. And he fails to show what evidence at an
evidentiary hearing would have altered CSRB's legal conclusions. Instead, he
mistakenly implies that all of the events listed in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8,
including an evidentiary hearing, must occur in every formal proceeding, even
when unnecessary to the resolution of the case. Any purported factual
disputes regarding the merits of his claims were not material to the
jurisdictional analysis because an employee is only entitled to a hearing on
the merits of a grievance once he establishes that CSRB has jurisdiction. See
Lopez, 834 P.2d at 573 n.4.
Even assuming that CSRB erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing,
it does not follow that a missing evidentiary component in a CSRB proceeding
transforms what was designated by rule as a formal proceeding into an
informal proceeding. Any procedural deficiency in a formal proceeding is
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simply that - a procedural deficiency. Blauer's authority does not suggest
that a formal proceeding becomes informal whenever an agency commits an
error in how it conducts that proceeding. This Court has never held that a
violation of UAPA's Section 8 - containing the requirements for a formal
proceeding - necessarily renders a proceeding informal. See Lopez, 834 P.2d
at 571. Instead, this Court has stated only that "[s]ince there was a hearing,
and there is no showing of any violations of Section 8, we conclude this was a
formal adjudicative proceeding that we may properly review/' Id. Likewise,
UAPA's provisions for designating formal and informal proceedings do not
suggest that a deficiency in a formal proceeding changes the status of the
proceeding. Rather, UAPA provides that a proceeding changes from formal to
informal status by CSRB's designation only, either by rule or by express
conversion. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (West 2004).
Moreover, transferring this case to the district court would impose a
collateral, summary reversal of the district court's April 6th dismissal order.
It would force the district court to review a CSRB decision it has already
determined it lacks jurisdiction to review. This would further complicate the
procedural dilemma Blauer has created with his duplicative filings. If, as
Blauer argues, judicial review of the CSRB's decision is properly in the
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district court, then he should have appealed the district court's April 6th
dismissal order and sought to have that order reversed.
At best, an error in how CSRB conducted a formal proceeding may
justify a remand to CSRB with instructions to correct the deficiency, not
require transfer of the appeal to the district court for a trial de novo. But
Blauer does not argue that the matter should be remanded to CSRB for an
evidentiary hearing. Nor does he point to any evidence excluded by CSRB
material to its jurisdictional conclusion. Instead, he plunges into the merits of
the newly raised issues, even though CSRB did not reach the merits of those
issues. This appeal, however, is not about the merits of Blauer's belated
claims. It concerns CSRB's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the
merits of those claims, based on Blauer's failure to properly appeal them
within the statutory grievance procedures.

2.

CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Blauer's
belated claims.
CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Blauer's new

claims because those claims had not been timely appealed through the
statutory grievance process. In his opening brief, Blauer extensively discusses
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the merits of his claims but does not address his failure to preserve them for
CSRB review. This constitutes a waiver of the issues, and this Court should
affirm the CSRB on that basis alone. See Brown, 2000 UT 89 at f 23 (stating
that failure to raise issue in opening brief generally constitutes waiver).
In any event, CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over
the six new claims in Blauer's request for reconsideration. CSRB's authority
is set forth in the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act (GAPA). See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-101 to -408 (West 2004). GAPA limits CSRB's
jurisdiction to certain types of employment decisions. Utah Code Ann. § 6719a-202(l) (West 2004). CSRB's jurisdiction is limited to resolve only those
disputes "that have not been resolved at an earlier stage in the grievance
procedure/' Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202 (West Supp. 2006). Other than as
authorized by GAPA, CSRB "has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other
personnel matters. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l)(b) (emphasis added).
An aggrieved employee must initiate a grievance within 20 days of
theevent being grieved or, with a showing excusable neglect,8 within one year:
(5)(a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for

8

CSRB "shall determine the applicability of the excusable neglect
standard on the basis of good cause/' Utah Admin. Code R. 137-1-13(3).
Blauer made no showing or mention of excusable neglect before the CSRB
and likewise makes not mention of it in his opening brief.
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excusable neglect established by rule, an employee may submit a
grievance for review under this chapter only if the employee
submits the grievance:
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving
rise to the grievance; or
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee
has knowledge of the event giving rise to the
grievance.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection 5(a), an employee may not
submit a grievance more than one year after the event giving rise
to the grievance.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5) (West 2004) (emphasis added). Once a
grievance is initiated, an employee must process the grievance up to his
department head within certain time limits before appealing to the CSRB.
See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-402 (West Supp. 2004). Failure to meet the
statutory time limits for processing a grievance results in both a waiver of the
employee's right to grieve and of the right to judicial review. Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-19a-401(4)(a)9 ("Unless the employee meets the requirements for
excusable neglect established by rule, if the employee fails to process the
grievance to the next step within the time limits established in this part, he
has waived his right to process the grievance or obtain judicial review of the

9

See also Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(4)(b) (West 2004) ("Unless the
employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect established by rule, if
the employee fails to process the grievance to the next step within the time
limits established in this part, the grievance is considered to be settled based
on the decision made at the last step/')
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grievance.")
As set forth below, CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
over the Blauer's six new claims.
First, Blauer's claim regarding job performance parameters and
performance plan was correctly dismissed because he did not timely appeal
that claim to CSRB. That claim was made as part of Blauer's first grievance
in July 2003. R. 643-44. Blauer received a favorable ruling on the 2003
grievance from his department head (Level 4) and did not timely appeal the
grievance further. An appeal from a Level 4 decision must be made to CSRB
within ten days: "If the written grievance submitted to the employee's
department head meets the subject matter requirements of Section 67-19a302 and if... the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued,
the employee may submit the grievance in writing to the administrator
within ten working days." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(5) (West 2004). As
CSRB correctly noted, Blauer admitted that he never appealed the Step 4
decision on this first grievance. R. 643. Accordingly, CSRB lacked jurisdiction
over the claim and properly dismissed it.
Second, Blauer's claim that he was being assigned tasks outside his job
description was correctly dismissed by CSRB because the claim was part of
his demotion grievance. The demotion issue has now been considered by
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CSRB, the district court, and this Court. All three tribunals determined that
the reassignment was not a demotion. Specifically, this Court agreed that, "in
reapportioning Blauer's job responsibilities from part-time to full-time
adjudicator, [the Department] did nothing more than extend one of Blauer's
core job functions, in response to varying department needs." Blauer v. Dep't
of Workforce Servs., 2005 UT App 488, f 32, 128 P.3d 1204. Accordingly, the
CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider further the
issue. Even if this new claim were severable from the demotion claim, CSRB
lacked jurisdiction to hear it because Blauer filed no antecedent grievance
with the Department identifying the issue in its own right.
Third, Blauer's claim of unlawful harassment and retaliation was
properly dismissed by CSRB because Blauer filed no timely antecedent
grievance with the Department. The claim was not brought in either of
Blauer's prior grievances, but was made for the first time in the request for
reconsideration. Moreover, because Blauer asserted that the claim arose out
of his request for accommodation for a disability, he should have made the
claim before the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor, which has
exclusive jurisdiction to decide discrimination claims. See Buckner v.
Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 852 (Utah 2004) (stating that "the exclusive remedy for
an employee claiming a violation of the UADA [Utah Antidiscrimination Act]
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is an appeal to the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor"); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-5-107U5) (West 2004) (stating that UADA is the "exclusive
remedy under State law for employment discrimination"); Gottling v. P.R.,
Inc., 2002 UT 95, f 10, 61 R3d 989 (same).
Fourth, Blauer's claim regarding personnel records was correctly
dismissed because Blauer never filed a timely antecedent grievance with the
Department.
Fifth, Blauer's claim regarding administrative leave was correctly
dismissed by CSRB because it was neither timely grieved to the Department's
director no timely appealed to CSRB.
And, sixth, Blauer's claim regarding written reprimands was also
correctly dismissed by CSRB because Blauer never filed a timely antecedent
grievance within the Department.
Because Blauer failed to meet the statutory time limits for processing
his antecedent grievance claims, he waived both his right to grieve and his
right to judicial review, and CSRB correctly concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear Blauer's new claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a401(4)(a) ("Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next
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step within the time limits established in this part, he has waived his right to
process the grievance or obtain judicial review of the grievance.")

Conclusion
Jurisdiction over this appeal is properly with this Court because the
CSRB's decision was designated by clear administrative rule as a formal
adjudication. Moreover, this Court has already denied Blauer's motion to
transfer this case to the district court for a trial de novo. In addition, Blauer
should be estopped from arguing that a trial de novo is a proper remedy
because the third district court ruled against Blauer on this identical
argument, and Blauer has acquiesced in the ruling by not appealing it.
CSRB correctly dismissed the six remanded claims because Blauer did
not timely appeal those claims through the statutory grievance process.
Accordingly, the Department asks this Court to affirm CSRB's decision.
Dated this Q_t^3ky

of August, 2007.

r. CLIFFORD PETERSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Department of Workforce Services
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ADDENDUM A
April 9, 2007 Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Blauer v.
Dep't of Workforce Servs., Third Judicial District Court, No. 070900108.

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Jud-;- i=»l District

APR 0 9,2007

PHILIP S. LOTT (5750)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
LORINBLAUER,
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS TO DISMISS

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
SERVICES, an agency and instrumentality of the
State of Utah; and the CAREER SERVICE
REVIEW BOARD OF UTAH, an agency of the
State of Utah of the State of Utah,

Civil No. 070900108
Judge Joseph C. Fratto

Defendants.
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for hearing on March 26, 2007, of Defendants'
separate Motions to Dismiss; Plaintiff appearing by and through his counsel, Vincent C. Rampton;
Defendant Utah Department of Workforce Services (DWS) appearing by and through its counsel,
Philip S. Lott; and Defendant Career Service Review Board (CSRB) appearing by and through its
counsel, Steven K. Walkenhorst; the Court having reviewed the pleadings, received oral arguments from
counsel, and being otherwise fully advised, FINDS:
1. The Complaint herein alleges that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over a CSRB Decision
which dismissed Plaintiff Blauer's employment grievance against Defendant DWS related to alleged

violations of personnel rules. Complaint at KH 4, 5.
2. The Complaint seeks trial de novo by this Court of Plaintiff Blauer's employment grievance
and declaratory judgment regarding the nature of the CSRB Decision. Complaint at 14-15.
3. The CSRB is the final administrative body to review grievances from Utah career service
employees of, among others, alleged violations of personnel rules. U.C.A. § 67-19a-202.
4. When an employee files a grievance with the CSRB, the CSRB is required to determine,
among others, whether or not it has jurisdiction over the grievance and whether or not the employee has
been directly harmed. U.C.A. § 67-19a-403(2)(a).
5. On October 24,2006, the CSRB held a hearing to consider whether it had jurisdiction over
Plaintiff Blauer's employment grievance.
6. The October 24, 2006 CSRB hearing was a jurisdictional hearing at which the parties,
Plaintiff Blauer and Defendant DWS, appeared and presented written and oral arguments.
7. A CSRB jurisdictional hearing is a formal adjudication. Utah Administrative Code R137-117.
8. Following the October 24,2006 jurisdictional hearing the CSRB issued its Decision on
Agency's Motion to Dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff Blauer's employment grievance.
9. An aggrieved employee or the responding agency may appeal the CSRB's formal
adjudicative jurisdictional hearing decision and final agency action to the Utah Court of Appeals.
U.C.A. § 63-46b-16; Utah Administrative Code R137-1-17.
10. Utah district courts are not granted jurisdiction over such appeals.
11. On December 29, 2006, before filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff Blauer filed with the Utah Court
2

of Appeals a Petition for Review of Administrative Agency Decision, seeking judicial review of the
CSRB Decision. Blauer v. Utah Department of Workforce Services and Utah Career Service Review
Board, Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 20061177 (2006).
12. This Court (the Third Judicial District Court) does not have jurisdiction to review the CSRB
Decision on Agency's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.
13. The CSRB is not a proper party to an appeal of its own decision. Blauer v. Department of
Workforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204,1210 (Utah App. 2005).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
1. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are granted and Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed in its
entirety.
DATED this Yy

#_
day of April, 2007.

Approved as to form:

Vincent C. Rampton

Philip S. Lott

Steven K. Walkenhorst
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ADDENDUM B
May 7, 2007 Order of the Utah Court of Appeals

FILED
UTAH APPFI LATE COMR T O

MAY 0 7 2007

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Lorin Blauer,

ORDER

Petitioner,

Case No. 20061177-CA

v.
Utah Department of Workforce
Services, an agency of the
State of Utah, and Utah Career
Service Review Board,
Respondents.

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Davis.
This matter is before the court on petitioner Lorin Blauer's
motion to transfer his appeal.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied.
Dated this

7

day of

FOR THE COURT:

Judixh M. Billings, Judge/X

lYl^Lj

, 2007.

ADDENDUM C
Determinative Statutes and Rules

§ 63-46b-3

STATE AFFAIRS

Note 4
mal contract with his agency yet never notified
the Department of his absence as required by
the licensure statute; in short, the default resulted from the agent's failure to exercise due diligence, not from excusable neglect. U.CA.1953,
31A-23-312(1),
63-46b-3(2)(b)(i),
63-46b-ll(3)(a)r Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b)(1).
Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dept., 1999,
991 P.2d 607, 382 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 1999 UT
App 330. Insurance <§=> 1620
5.

Decertification proceedings
Victim of wildlife conservation officer's acts
was not entitled to initiate decertification proceedings before division of police officer standards and training (POST). -U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-3(3)(a). Nielson v. Division of Peace
Officer Standards and Training, (POST), Dept.
of Public Safety, 1993, 851 P.2d 1201. Administrative Law And Procedure <3=» 450.1; Game
<S=>6
6.

Applicable law
Reference to "applicable law" found in statute permitting persons other than agency to
initiate adjudicative proceedings if law applicable to agency so permits is to agency's enabling
statute, not rules. U.CA.1953, 63-46b-3(3)(a).
Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Standards
and Training, (POST), Dept. of Public Safety,

1993, 851 P.2d 1201. Administrative Law And
Procedure <£=> 450.1
7.

Dismissal
Provision of Administrative Procedures f Act
pursuant to which presiding officer may notify
party requesting agency action that further proceedings are required to determine agency's response to request authorized Industrial Commission to dismiss workers' compensation
claims without prejudice, particularly where ba^
sis for dismissals was failure to diligently pros^Q-,
cute claims. U.CA.1953, 63-46b-3(3)(d) t (iii).
Doubletree, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of Utah,
1990, 797 P.2d 464. Administrative Law And
Procedure ^ 467; Workers' Compensation &=>
1174
8.

Appeal
Driver's failure to object at beginning of hearing on suspension of his license to the failure of
the Division of Drivers License Services to include in its notice of hearing advice as to whether the license revocation hearing was formal or
informal, after he was clearly informed that the
proceeding would be conducted informally, precluded driver from claiming error on this
ground
on
appeal.
U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-3(2)(a)(v). Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 1-990, 790 P.2d 587. Administrative Law
And Procedure @=> 669.1; Automobiles <§=>
144.2(2.1)

§ 6 3 - 4 6 b - 4 . Designation of adjudicative proceedings as informal—Standards—Undesignated proceedings formal
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings
to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules
enacted under the authority of this chapter if:
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any procedural
requirement imposed by a statute other than this chapter;
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the parties to the proceedings
will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures;
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will be
enhanced by categorizations; and
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the potential
benefits to the public of a formal adjudicative proceeding.
(2) Subject to'the provisions of Subsection (3),.all agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's
rules shall be conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter.
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding, the
presiding officer may convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal
adjudicative" proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal
adjudicative proceeding if:
504

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT

§ 63-46b~4
Note 3

(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights of
any party.
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 260.
Administrative Code References
Administrative rules, adjudicative proceedings, see Utah Admin. Code 15-5.
Administrative services, debt collection, Office of State Debt Collection administrative procedures,
see Utah Admin. Code^21-2.
Information technology services, Division of Informational Technology Services, adjudicative "pro*
ceedmgs, see Utah Admin. Code 29-1.

Library References
Administrative Law^and Procedure <S=»446.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 15Ak446.

C.J.S. Public Administrative |-aw and Procedure § 116.

Research References
Jreatises and Practice Aids
t£0 Federal Register 37002, Utah Regulatory
Program and Utah Abandoned Mine Land
Reclamation (AMLR) Plan
Notes of Decisions
driver's arrest for driving under influence of
intoxicating beverage (DUI), where Department's decision was based on informal hearing
presided over by hearing officer. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-0 5 to 63-46b-22, 63~46b-4(l). jCordo1 In general
vav Blackstock, 1993, 861 P.2d 449. AdminisUnder Utah Administrative Procedures Act trative Law And Procedure <S=> 744 1, Automo(IJ-APA), each applicant has opportunity to have biles '<&» 144.2(4)
formal hearing before agency, or de novo reAdministrative law judge's decision that
view by district court. l U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-0.5
workers' compensation claims were barred, and
t0^ 63-46b-22, 63-46b-4(l). Cordova v. BlackIndustrial Commission's review thereof, constistock, 1993, 861 P.2d 449. Administrative Law tuted formal adjudicative proceedings which
And Procedure <§=> 469.1, Administrative Law were properly reviewed by Court of Appeals.
£&d Procedure <®=> ,744.1
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-4, 63-46b-16 Hales v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 1993, 854 P.2d 537.
M Conversion to formal proceedings
; Broker dealer's challenge to state Division of Administrative Law And Procedure p=> 663;
Securities' converting proceedings against bro- Workers' Compensation <S> 1858*
Sale of parcel of public land by division of
ker dealer from informal to formal failed to
comply with rule requiring citations to authori- state lands and forestry was not a final order or
$ f \vhere only authority cited by broker dealer decree from a formal adjudicative proceeding
in""support of argument that Division acted im- but, rather arose from informal adjudicative
properly was statute that supported Division's proceedings; therefore, Supreme Court lacked
action; thus, appeal of issue was disregarded. jurisdiction over petition challenging sale.
Southern Utah
tt£JU953,
63-46b-4(3),
63-46b-6
to U.C.A.1953, 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii)
iS46b-iO; Rules App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9). Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands and
Jghnson-Bowles Co., Inc. v. Division of Securi- Forestry of State, 1992, 830 P.2d 233. States
ties of Dept. of Commerce of State of Utah, <3=>$9
Supreme "Court has jurisdiction only over fi1992,~ 829 P.2d 101, certiorari denied 843 P.2d
nal prders and decrees of agencies that origi5,16. Securities Regulation <&=> 275
nate in formal adjudicative proceedings U.C.A.
3.- Judicial review
1953, 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii). Southern Utah Wilderd i s t r i c t court was required to hold trial de ness Alliance v Board of State Lands and Fornovp to review Department of Public Safety's estry of State, 1992, 830 P.2d 233. Administradecision to suspend driver's license based on tive Law And Procedure <&=» 704
Injgeneral 1
Conversion to formal proceedings
Judicial review 3
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§67-19a-201

STATE OFFICERS & EMPLOYEES

(6) Each year, the board shall choose a chair and vice chair from its own
members.
(7)(a) Three members of the board are a quorum for the transaction of
business.
(b) Action by a majority of members when a quorum is present is action of
the board.
(8)(a) Members shall receive no compensation or benefits for their services,
but may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the performance of the
member's official duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance
under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their
service.
Laws 1989, c 191, § 7, Laws 1996, c 194, § 24, eff April 29, 1996, Laws 1996, c 243,
§ 183, eff April 29, 1996
Historical and Statutory Notes
Section 27 of Laws 1996, c 194, provides
"If this bill, H B 403 [Laws 1996, c 242],
D
., n
_, „ n
,._
i
c. _
State Boards, Commissions Committees and
Councils Amendments, and H B 406 [Laws
1996, c 243], State Boards and Commissions—
Benefits and Terms, all pass, it is the intent of
the Legislature that all of the amendments to
sections in this bill supersede the amendments

to sections in H B 403 and H B 406 that con£<* with them
If, however, any sections in
H B 403, State Boards, Commissions, Committees>

and

CounciJs

AmendmentS)

or

H B

406>

Commissions-Benefits and
T e r m s r e p e a l s e c t i o n s amended by this bill, it is
the intent of the Legislature that the repealers in
H B 403 and H B 406 supersede any amendments made by this bill "
State

Boards

and

Library References
3

Officers and Public Employees <®= 69 3
Westlaw Key Number Search 283k69 3

C J S Officers and Public Employees §§ 71 to
72, 121, 130, 160

R e s e a r c h References
Treatises and Practice Aids
Emp Discnm Coord Analysis of State Law
§ 49 88, State Personnel Management Act
HRS Fair Employment Practices § 68 45,
State Personnel Management Act

§ 67-19a-202.

HRS Fair Employment Practices 325,900,
Utah

Powers—Jurisdiction

(l)(a) The board shall serve as the final administrative body to review
appeals from career service employees and agencies of decisions about promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable administration
of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of
position that have not been resolved at an earlier stage in the grievance
procedure.
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other personnel
matters.
(2) The time limits established in this chapter supersede the procedural time
limits established in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act
810
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§67-19a-203

(3) In conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other proceeding, any m e m b e r of the board may:
(a) administer oaths;
(b) certify official acts;
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence; and
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule.
Laws 1989, c 191, § 8, Laws 1991, c 101, § 3, Laws 1991, c 204, § 8
Library References
Officers and Public Employees <S=>69 3
Westlaw Key Number Search 283k69 3

C J S Officers and Public Employees \
72, 121, 130, 160

71 to

Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
Emp Discrim Coord Analysis of State Law
§ 49 88, State Personnel Management Act
HRS Fair Employment Practices § 68 45,
State Personnel Management Act

HRS Fair Employment
Utah

Practices

325,900,

Notes o£ Decisions
In general 1
Job sharing 3
Presumptions and burden of proof
Suspensions 2

67-19a-202(l)
Lopez v Career Service Review Bd , 1992, 834 P 2d 568, certiorari denied
843 P 2d 1042 Officers And Public Employees
<S=>72 22
3.

1. In general
Career Service Review Board had subject
matter jurisdiction to issue order to Department
of Corrections, requiring that career service employee be restored to former rank and salary
U C A 1 9 5 3 , 67-19a-202
Career Service Review Bd v Utah Dept of Corrections, 1997,
942 P 2d 933, 322 Utah Adv Rep 8
Officers
And Public Employees <®=> 72 33(1)
2.

Suspensions
For purposes of determining whether Career
Service Review Board had jurisdiction of its
gnevance, senior investigator with Utah State
Industrial Commission was not given ' de facto
suspension" when Commission required him to
take unpaid leave of absence in order to attend
law school, employee made conscious decision
to attend law school after being formally noti
fied that he would be required to take a leave of
absence
if
he
did
so
UCA1953,

Job sharing
For purposes of determining whether Career
Service Review Board had jurisdiction to hear
state employee's grievance, Utah State Industrial Commission's decision not to allow senior
investigator to job share did not violate personnel rule, insofar as rule gave Commission full
discretion as to whether job sharing would be
allowed U C A 1953, 67-19a-202(l) Lopez v
Career Service Review Bd , 1992, 834 P 2d 568,
certiorari denied 843 P 2d 1042 Officers And
Public Employees <£=> 72 22
4.

Presumptions and burden of proof
State employee had burden of showing that
his grievance fit mto statutorily designated category in order to bring that gnevance before
Career Service Review Board
UCA1953,
67-19a-202(l)
Lopez v Career Service Review Bd , 1992, 834 P 2d 568, certiorari denied
843 P 2d 1042 Officers And Public Employees
€=>72 61

§ 6 7 - 1 9 a - 2 0 3 . Rulemaking authority
The board may make rules governing.
(1) definitions of terms, phrases, and words used in the gnevance process
established by this chapter,
(2) what matters constitute excusable neglect for purposes of the waiver of
time limits established by this chapter,
811
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PART 4.

PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED
BY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE

§ 6 7 - 1 9 a - 4 0 1 . Time limits for submission of appeal by aggrieved employee—Voluntary termination of employment—Group grievances
(1) Subject to the standing requirements contained in Part 3 and the restrictions contained in this part, a career service employee may have a grievance
addressed by following the procedures specified in this part.
(2) The employee and the person to whom the grievance is directed may
agree in writing to waive or extend grievance steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time limits
specified for those grievance steps, as outlined in Section 67-19a-402.
(3) Any writing made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be submitted to the
administrator.
(4)(a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next
step within the time limits established in this part, he has waived his right to
process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the grievance.
(b) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next
step within the time limits established in this part, the grievance is considered to be settled based on the decision made at the last step.
(5)(a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, an employee may submit a grievance for review under this
chapter only if the employee submits the grievance:
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the grievance; or
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has knowledge of the
event giving rise to the grievance.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an employee may not submit a
grievance more than one year after the event giving rise to the grievance.
(6) A person who has voluntarily terminated his employment with the state
may not submit a grievance after he has terminated his employment.
(7)(a) When several employees allege the same grievance, they may submit a
group grievance by following the procedures and requirements of this chapter.
(b) In submitting a group grievance, each aggrieved employee shall sign
the complaint.
(c) The administrator and board may not treat a group grievance as a class
action, but may select one aggrieved employee's grievance and address that
grievance as a test case.
Laws 1989, c. 191, § 14, Laws 1991, c. 101, § 6; Laws 1991, c. 204, § 11; Laws 1999,
c 21, § 86, eff. May 3, 1999.
Cross References
Rules Civ Proc , Rule 23
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Library References
<

Officers and Public Employees §=>72.27.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 283k72.27.

C.J.S. Officers and Public Employees §§ 143,
196 to 197.

Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
Emp. Discrim. Coord. Analysis of State Law
§ 49:88, State Personnel Management Act.
HRS Fair Employment Practices § 68:45,
State Personnel Management Act.

HRS Fair Employment Practices 325,900,
Utah.

United States Supreme Court
Class actions,
Standing as a class of one, equal protecNatural gas leases, class actions, opportution, see Village of Willowbrook v.
nity to "opt out", see Phillips PetroOlech, U.S.I11.2000, 120 S.Ct. 1073,
leum Co. v. Shutts, U.S.Kan. 1985, 105
528 U S 562
S.Ct. 2965, 472 U.S. 797, 86 L.Ed.2d
628, on remand 240 Kan. 764, 732
P.2d 1286.
Notes of Decisions
Judicial review

1

1. Judicial review
* Former employee of Department of Public
Safety, who brought action seeking vindication
of Personnel Management Act rights, failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies, and thus,

§ 67—19a—402.

Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over Act
claim, where employee allowed his Career Service R e v i e w
Board appeal to be dismissed for
faiIure
t0
prosecute.
U.C.A.
1953,
67-19a-401(4)(a). Hom v. Utah Dept. of Public
Safety, 1998, 962 P.2d 95, 347 Utah Adv. Rep.
50. Officers And Public Employees <$=> 72.41(2)

Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved employee

(l)(a) A career service employee who believes he has a grievance shall
attempt to resolve the grievance through discussion with his supervisor.
(b) Within five days after the employee discusses the grievance with him,
the employee's supervisor may issue a verbal decision on the grievance.
(2)(a) If the grievance remains unanswered for five working days after its
submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the supervisor's
verbal decision, the employee may resubmit the grievance in writing to his
immediate supervisor within five working days after the expiration of the
period for response or receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is
submitted, the employee's supervisor shall issue a written response to the
grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision.
(c) Immediately after submitting the written grievance to his supervisor,
the employee shall notify the administrator of the board that he has submitted the written grievance.
(3)(a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's supervisor remains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee may
submit the grievance in writing to his agency or division director within ten
817
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working days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the
decision, whichever is first.
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is
submitted, the employee's agency or division director shall issue a written
response to the grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the
decision.
(4)(a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's agency or division
director remains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if
the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee
may submit the grievance in writing to his department head within ten working
days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision,
whichever is first.
(b) Within ten working days after the employee's written grievance is
submitted, the department head shall issue a written response to the grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision.
(c) The decision of the department head is final in all matters except those
matters that the board may review under the authority of Part 3.
(5) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's department head
meets the subject matter requirements of Section 67-19a-302 and if the
grievance remains unanswered for ten working days after its submission, or if
the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee
may submit the grievance in writing to the administrator within ten working
days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision,
whichever is first.
Laws 1989, c. 191, § 15; Laws 1989, 2nd Sp Sess., c. 3, § 2; Laws 1991, c 204, § 12.
Library References
Officers and Public Employees <3=>72 20
Westlaw Key Number Search 283k72 20

C J S Officers and Public Employees §§ 143,
195

R e s e a r c h References
Treatises and Practice Aids
Emp Discnm Coord Analysis of State Law
§ 49 88, State Personnel Management Act
HRS Fair Employment Practices § 68 45,
State Personnel Management Act

HRS Fair Employment Practices
Utah

325,900,

N o t e s of D e c i s i o n s
Notice

1

1.

Notice
Agency, as well as employee, is entitled to
notice of issues to be raised before Career Ser-

§ 67-19a-4Q3.

vice Review Board (CSRB) in connection with
review of disciplinary action Lunnen v Utah
Dept of Transp , 1994, 886 P 2d 70, certiorari
denied 892 P 2d 13 Administrative Law And
Procedure <S^ 513, Officers And Public Employees <£=> 72 28

Appeal to administrator—Jurisdictional hearing

(1) At any time after a career service employee submits a grievance to the
administrator under the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator
818

R137-1-17. Jurisdictional Hearing.
A jurisdictional hearing is a formal adjudication conducted according to Subsection 67-193- 403(2)(b)(i) with Section 6346b-8 of the UAPA incorporated by reference. An administrative review of the file is an informal adjudication according to
Subsection 67-i9a-403(2)(b)(ii) with Section 63-46^4 of the UAPA incorporated by reference.
(1) Procedural Issues. The administrator shall determine the following: timeliness, standing, direct harm, jurisdiction, and
eligibility of the issues to be advanced, and any other procedural matters or jurisdictional controversies according to Sections
67-193-403 and 67-193-404.
(2) Determination. The administrator shall determine which types of grievances may be heard at the evidentiary/step 5
level. Those types of grievances found to have been resolved at a lower level or those that do not qualify for advancement to the
evidentiary/step 5 level are precluded from further consideration in any grievance submitted for CSRB consideration.
(3) Preclusion. Those types of actions not listed in Subsections 67-i9a-202(i)(a) and 67-193-302(1) are precluded from
advancement to the evidentiary/step 5 level. When the grievance is precluded from the evidentiary/step 5 level, the matter
under dispute shall be deemed as final at the level of the department head/step 4 written reply according to Subsection 67-193302(2).

(4) Reconsideration. A written request for reconsideration may be filed with the administrator. It must be filed within 20
days from the date that 3 jurisdictions! hesring decision or 3n 3dministrative review of the file decision is issued with Section
63-46b-i3 of the UAPA incorporated by reference. The written reconsideration request must contain specific reasons why a
reconsideration is warranted with respect to the factusl findings 3nd legsl conclusions of the jurisdictionsl hearing decision or
administrative review of the file decision. New or additional evidence may not be considered.
(5) Judicial Review.
(a) The aggrieved employee or the responding agency may appeal the administrator's formal adjudicative jurisdictionsl
hearing decision and final agency action to the Utah Court of Appeals within 30 calendar days from the date of issuance
according to Subsection 63-46b-i4(3)(a) and Section 63-46b-i6 of the UAPA which are incorporated by reference.
(b) The aggrieved employee or the responding agency may appesl the administrator's informal 3djudic3tive decision 3iid
final agency action of an administrative review of the file to the district court according to Sections 63-46^15 and 63-46^17 of
the UAPA which are incorporated by reference.
(6) Summary Judgment. The administrator may, pursuant to an administrative review of the procedural facts and
circumstances of a grievance case, summarily dispose of a case on the ground that:
(a) the matter is untimely;
(b) the grievant has failed to appear at the properly scheduled date, time, and plsce pursusnt to written notice;
(c) the grievsnt tecks standing;
(d) the grievant has withdrawn or otherwise absndoned the grievance;
(e) the grievant has not been directly harmed;
(f) the issue grieved does not quslify to be advanced beyond step 4; or
(g) the requested remedy or relief exceeds the scope of these grievance procedures.
(7) Transcription and Transcript Fees. If a psrty appeals a jurisdictional hearing decision to the Utah Court of Appeals or
to the district court, the appealing party is responsible for paying all transcription costs and any transcript fees. The CSRB does
not particip3te in the psyment of these fees when sppeals are taken to the appellate or trial court. See Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rule 11, and Section 63-46^16(3), regarding transcript costs from formal adjudications under the UAPA.

